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Introduction
The California Global Warming Act (AB 32) – a 
cutting edge policy that no one expected to pass 
so quickly and with so much bipartisan support –  
proposes to cut green house gas emissions to 1990 
levels by 2020.  The successful implementation 
of such a standard would mean reducing carbon 
emissions from major polluters around the state – 
cement refineries, power plants, and oil refineries top 
among them. It’s a clear victory for all Californians, 
it would seem – but the underlying picture may be a 
bit more complicated.
As we have shown in a recent report entitled 
The Climate Gap (Morello-Frosch, et al. 2009), 
climate change is not affecting all people equally: 
communities of color and low-income communities 
suffer the greatest negative health and economic 
consequences. Among the many disparate impacts, 
these communities are more vulnerable to heat 
incidents, more exposed to air pollution, and may 
be more affected by the economic dislocations of 
ongoing climate change. 
While reducing greenhouse gas emissions will benefit 
all Californians, a carbon reduction system that 
does not take co-pollutants into account could likely 
result in significantly varying benefits for different 
populations. Those who are most likely to suffer the 
negative consequences of a short-sighted carbon 
trading system are the communities of color and the 
low-income communities already facing the greatest 
impacts of climate change – widening instead of 
narrowing the climate gap.
Consider the La Paloma power plant and the Exxon 
Mobil refinery in Torrance. The La Paloma power 
plant sits about 35 miles west of Bakersfield in 
an abandoned oil field just outside the small town 
of McKittrick (population 160) with less than 600 
residents in the surrounding six miles, and no other 
facilities in the immediate vicinity. The Exxon Mobil 
refinery, on the other hand, is one of many facilities 
affecting nearly 800,000 people in the encircling six 
miles. While these facilities share one similarity – 
according to recently released 2008 GHG emissions 
data from the California Air Resources Board, they 
both emit between 2.5 and 3 million tons of carbon 
dioxide each year – La Paloma releases 48.6 tons 
of asthma and cancer causing particulate matter 
per year while Exxon Mobil emits 352.2 tons. This 
staggering health risk is important to people who 
live in Torrance’s dense neighborhoods, yet this fact 
is often ignored in the debates about how we might 
best implement AB 32.
Why is the difference between reducing emissions 
at La Paloma and in Torrance overlooked in the 
discussion about mitigating climate change? Part of 
the reason is that too much of the discussion stays 
at the macro-level: climate change is imagined as 
ozone layer erosion, heat waves, and sea level rises. 
So while the catastrophic potential of climate change 
is well documented, the story of the climate gap – 
the often unequal impact the climate crisis has on 
people of color and the poor in the United States – is 
just starting to be told. Until recently, systemic efforts 
to combat climate change have focused primarily on 
reducing carbon with little, if any, regard for where 
the reductions take place and who they might affect. 
In this view, reducing greenhouse gas emissions – no 
matter where it occurs – is the central objective of 
policy change. 
People, however, do live somewhere – and it is at 
the local and not the macro level where changes 
from new policy will be most immediately felt. When 
smoke stacks in low-income communities belch less 
carbon, they also emit less particulate matter, sulfuric 
oxides, and nitrous oxides. When truck operators 
retrofit their units to reduce emissions, children’s 
asthma rates are likely to fall along the traffic 
corridors that they impact. Paying attention to the 
climate gap – focusing on the co-pollutants and the 
potential co-benefits of greenhouse gas reductions 
– is important for public health. And lifting this issue 
up can give California not only a chance to address 
its historic pattern of environmental inequity but also 
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the opportunity to implement a climate change policy 
that will be replicated throughout the nation. 
Additionally, the economic opportunity that could 
be realized by reducing air pollution in dense 
neighborhoods is also enormous. All Californians are 
affected by higher insurance premiums, medical 
costs and lost productivity due to the many illnesses 
caused by air pollution, and all stand to benefit 
from an equitable system that would work toward 
minimizing these costs as opposed to adding to this 
growing burden. Not only does it make economic 
sense, but the text of AB 32 itself also requires CARB 
in designing any market-based mechanisms for 
GHG reductions to consider the localized impacts 
in communities that are already impacted by air 
pollution, prevent any increase in co-pollutants, and 
maximize the co-benefits of co-pollutant reductions.1
This report seeks to analyze co-pollutants and 
co-benefits, with an eye toward thinking through 
policy designs that could help maximize public 
health and close the climate gap. We begin 
below by discussing why geographic inequality in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction is likely under 
any market-based scheme and why it matters for 
public health. We then describe the necessary 
baseline for any analysis, indicating how some major 
facilities that emit significant GHGs – power plants, 
petroleum refineries, and cement plants – affect 
their neighbors, and who (and how many) those 
neighbors are. We then take on a trickier task: 
assessing the potential impacts of a cap-and-trade 
program in California.  Because we cannot see into 
the market’s future, we take a simpler approach: 
we identify which industries and their associated 
facilities are driving environmental inequity, and use 
this to suggest how policy-makers could take this 
into account in fulfilling AB 32’s requirement to both 
reduce overall emissions and protect climate gap 
neighborhoods. 
AB 32 has heralded a new era of regulatory action 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and California 
finds itself once again leading the country in the 
area of environmental protection. As proud as we 
should be of that, we must be mindful that the 
state is deeply plagued by issues of environmental 
inequity, and that if our new climate change 
regulations are not designed to address the growing 
climate gap, the suffering of those who bear the 
brunt of this burden may grow. Numerous studies 
demonstrate that air pollution burdens tend to 
fall disproportionately on those who are the least 
privileged and the most vulnerable. We do not need 
to perpetuate and worsen this trend. Instead, we can 
lift up issues of public health and fair environmental 
policies to ensure that the implementation of AB 
32 is a success for all Californians and a model for 
the nation and a world looking for viable paths to 
environmental, social and economic sustainability.
The Problem
California is at the forefront of dealing with climate 
change, by setting new standards, driving toward 
energy efficiency, encouraging renewables, and 
even working to rebalance the mix of land uses 
and transportation that have produced our well-
documented sprawl. Within the context of our myriad 
efforts, the state has committed to the development 
of a “cap-and-trade” system in which GHG emissions 
from the facilities of certain polluting industries would 
be capped and emissions permits or “allowances” 
would be allocated (through auction, a fee, for 
free, or otherwise) to create a market for carbon 
emissions. In such a system, once the allowances 
are distributed for any compliance period, emitters 
of greenhouse gases whose emissions exceed their 
allowances may purchase allowances from other 
facilities – those who are reducing emissions beyond 
their own goals – rather than taking on the cost of 
reducing emissions from their own facilities. Another 
option, though highly controversial, is that they 
could cover their excess GHG emissions through the 
purchase of “offsets,” which are basically projects or 
activities that yield a net GHG emissions reduction 
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for which the ownership of the reduction can be 
transferred.
The arguments for cap-and-trade revolve around a 
narrow concept of industrial efficiency – if it is less 
costly for some firms to meet reduction goals, they 
should move first and fastest, and this will reduce 
the overall burden of compliance and perhaps speed 
the attainment of stricter GHG emissions targets 
overall (i.e. “the cap”). Some also argue that such a 
system could encourage technological innovation as 
firms seek to either buy fewer permits or chase the 
profit opportunities inherent in reducing their own 
emissions and offering their unused permits to other 
firms that cannot reduce as quickly. In this view, the 
market is being harnessed for public good, with the 
incentive structure providing businesses a positive 
reason to participate in making the intentions of AB 
32 real as well as the flexibility to meet goals.
Opponents of cap-and-trade worry that enforcement 
of such a market system is not feasible and that 
the market will inevitably be gamed, leading to a 
sinkhole of financial resources with little regulatory 
oversight; opponents point to the subprime mortgage 
crisis and the recent economic meltdown as 
examples of trading markets that went haywire with 
little accountability. Others have noted that some 
experiences with cap-and-trade, as in the early 
implementation in the European Union, did not lead 
to significant GHG reductions. Still others object to 
program design, particularly the notions 
of handing out allowances gratis to 
polluting firms –  something that is de 
facto a mass transfer of wealth from 
the general public to private polluters 
– and the use of offsets, which could 
displace actual emissions reductions in 
California through, for example, slowing 
deforestation somewhere across the 
globe.
While these are legitimate concerns 
this report explores a more limited 
and focused issue: whether or not 
implementation of cap-and-trade in 
California might fail to capture public health benefits, 
or even make an already inequitable situation worse, 
thereby failing to maximize the social good to the 
same extent that might be obtained from a different 
or better-designed system.
To see this, it is important to recognize that cap-
and-trade is inherently unequal. The cap part is, 
of course, equal: everyone gains from a regional 
reduction in GHG and the slowdown in climate 
change that might be induced. But the trade part 
is inherently unequal – or why would anyone trade? 
Indeed, trading is justified on the grounds that 
reducing pollution is more efficient in some locations 
compared to others, and thus where reductions 
will occur is a decision such a system leaves in the 
hands of the market and businesspeople – neither of 
which have any incentive to lower emissions in order 
to benefit the low-income and minority communities 
hit hardest by concentrated pollution.
Some argue that the location of the emissions 
reduction is not important – reductions in GHG 
benefit the planet no matter where they occur. But 
since GHG emissions are usually accompanied by 
releases of other pollutants, there could be very 
different impacts on the health of residents living 
near plants that choose, under cap-and-trade, to 
either reduce emissions or purchase their way out 
of that requirement. Therefore, the reductions made 
at the lowest marginal price might be efficient in 
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terms of the costs and benefits to the industrial 
economy, but would likely be enormously inefficient 
in a real sense if they fail to completely account for 
all external costs such as health impacts. Any carbon 
trading plan blind to the effects of co-pollutants 
would be deeply flawed in ignoring significant 
health impacts and the associated costs, such as 
the economic burden that could be shifted to other 
sectors, such as the healthcare system.  
This public health concern has been among the 
arguments made by members of the Environmental 
Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC) – a group 
made up of leaders representing the communities 
most impacted by pollution in the state and itself a 
product of the AB 32 legislation intended to advise 
the California Air Resources Board (CARB). EJAC 
has, among other things, been concerned that 
the Scoping Plan for AB 32 calls for a cap-and-
trade regulatory mechanism, which on its own, has 
no way to ensure the protection or improvement 
of environmentally degraded or stressed 
neighborhoods. 
The public health issue arises in part because while 
cap-and-trade tries to price in one externality – 
carbon and other GHG emissions – it does not price 
in all externalities, including the health and other 
impacts of co-pollutants. While quantifying such 
economic externalities is not our focus, Groosman et 
al. (2009) have found the health co-benefits alone 
from co-pollutant reductions due to a nationwide 
cap on carbon emissions may be greater than the 
cost of making such reductions itself – without 
even considering the large-scale benefits of slowing 
climate change. In a study of the co-benefits of 
carbon emissions reductions in the European Union, 
Berk et al. (2006) reached similar conclusions. 
There are reasonable arguments that other 
regulations, such as the Clean Air Act, can tame 
co-pollutant emissions and that one does not want 
to overload a new carbon trading system. Yet it is not 
clear why the introduction of a whole new market 
in carbon trading is not in and of itself sufficiently 
complicated that building in a few safeguards to 
protect stressed communities would be the straw 
that breaks the regulatory camel’s back. Moreover, 
given the well-founded skepticism of existing 
regulations that is held by many Environmental 
Justice (EJ) communities based on historical 
experiences, it is also not clear why the inclusion of 
safeguards would not make political sense as well. 
Of course, whether one wants to think about such 
safeguards at all depends on whether or not a 
market system actually does have the realistic 
potential to introduce uneven benefits in public 
health – and the rest of this document is devoted 
to assessing whether such a scenario is possible. 
Thus, we need to investigate the current distribution 
of plants with regard to race, income and population 
density in order to see whether this is a concern 
worthy of public policy (and not just academic) 
consideration. Although we believe it is, we would 
also offer a few caveats to the case we will make.
First, some have dismissed concerns around uneven 
emissions reductions, arguing that because of other 
regulations, cap-and-trade will never produce “hot 
spots” – that is, places where emissions of both GHG 
and co-pollutants actually increase (an outcome 
that actually occurred in Southern California, 
for example, in a poorly designed system that 
allowed NOx emissions trading between mobile and 
stationary sources, and led refineries to purchase 
and decommission “clunkers” rather than clean up 
near fenceline communities; see Drury, et al. 1999). 
Thus, any form of trading should meet the limited 
requirement in AB 32 that any market system should 
“prevent any increase in the emissions of toxic air 
contaminants or criteria air pollutants.”2
We do think that there is a possibility of “hot spots,” 
particularly if plants below current regulatory 
emissions requirements for co-pollutants might 
eventually be sunsetted and so operators step up 
production (and emissions) in the interim (just as 
one might run an aging appliance past its prime 
knowing that it will soon be replaced). This is by no 
means an extreme view: the potential for “hot spots” 
is acknowledged by some who are against imposing 
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any sort of health- or EJ-based constraints on the 
cap-and-trade system. Schatzki and Stavins (2009), 
for example, argue for mechanisms to address EJ 
concerns over cap-and-trade that are external to 
the the sytem itself (and particularly stress the use 
of traditional regulations for co-pollutants) but do 
concur that cap-and-trade could lead to an increase 
in local co-pollutant emissions, even if there is a net 
reduction statewide. However, we do not contend 
that this is the most likely outcome and believe that 
the main problem is one of missed opportunity: 
that we will fail to achieve and target public health 
benefits from GHG reductions in the communities 
that need them the most.
Second, while we focus here on cap-and-trade, 
the concerns we raise are equally applicable to the 
carbon fee system proposed by some cap-and-trade 
opponents. Although regulatory oversight is more 
straightforward in a fee-based system, here too, 
polluters can decide whether to reduce emissions or 
pay to pollute. We focus on cap-and-trade because it 
is the primary mechanism being discussed on both 
the state and federal policy agendas. The issues 
raised here are relevant to the potential gaps left by 
any market-based tool – cap-and-trade, carbon fee 
or a hybrid – and CARB must assess the potential for 
market-based mechanisms to worsen existing public 
health disparities before it develops such a regulatory 
framework.
Finally, we are not suggesting that considering 
inequitable health impacts in the development of 
a market-based carbon reduction plan is the only 
(or even the most important) piece of the puzzle 
in addressing the “climate gap”. There are many 
other areas of concern – such as the economic 
impacts on consumers, the job opportunities for 
low-skill workers, the role of urban heat islands, 
and the nature of our logistic and social preparation 
for extreme weather events. Still, we think that the 
public health piece is an important component within 
a larger climate justice debate.
The Data
To connect climate change indicators with 
neighborhood disparities, we combined several 
data sources. We specifically performed GIS spatial 
analysis using demographic and emissions data, 
working down to detailed neighborhood measures 
needed to understand local health impacts. 
Following a method developed by the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (Bailey et 
al. 2008), we pulled together emissions data on 
industries that are known to emit large quantities 
of CO2 – petroleum refineries, cement plants, and 
power plants.3 Together, the facilities included in our 
analysis from these sectors account for about 20 
percent of the state’s GHG emissions and will be the 
first group to come under regulation. We extracted 
data from two sources: the 2006 CARB Emissions 
Inventory4 for information on co-pollutants (NOx and 
PM10) and the 2008 GHG emission from CARB’s 
first annual release under the state’s mandatory 
GHG Reporting Program.5 The power plant data 
only includes those oil and natural gas plants who 
reported to the California Energy Commission 
(CEC) in 2007 that they produced at least 50 
online megawatts, and all other plants that may 
not have met that criteria but were either coal-fired 
or among the top 20 polluters of nitrous oxides 
(NOx), particulate matter (PM10), or carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e). Petroleum refineries and cement 
plants data are from 2006, and the resulting overall 
dataset includes 146 facilities, once restricted to 
those for which co-pollutant emissions information 
could be obtained from a total of 154 facilities 
considered. This set of facilities overlaid on racial 
demographics can be seen in Figure 1.
The process of attaching emissions to the facility 
location is similar to that followed by NRDC using an 
earlier version of the data to understand the regional 
health benefits of reducing emissions from these 
sources. Because we were interested in local health 
impacts, we conducted two additional steps in the 
preparation of this new iteration of the data. 
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Figure 1: Major GHG-Emitting Facilities in California 
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First, we used a variety of means to verify the 
address locations of the facilities indicated in the 
databases – a vital step since the purpose here is to 
consider local effects. While addresses were provided 
in the CARB Emissions Inventory for all facilities, 
these didn’t always match the actual locations, 
sometimes because they were for the company 
headquarters instead of the actual refinery or plant. 
To determine correct locations, we cross-referenced 
the addresses given by CARB Emissions Inventory 
with data from the GHG Reporting Program, the 
CEC power plants database, and a dataset of 
facility locations from the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which provided geographic 
coordinates in addition to addresses, and then used 
aerial imagery6 in Google Earth to visually confirm 
that the deduced coordinates were correct; in cases 
where they were not, we used the air photos to first 
find the facilities and then derive a set of coordinates 
that matched the emissions source at the facility. 
For a few facilities that seemed to be nowhere near 
their given coordinates or given address, we found 
their actual physical location through web-research, 
official documentation (e.g. permit history), and 
making phone calls to the parent companies.
Second, we verified NRDC’s calculations of how the 
facilities impact the health of their neighbors, and 
updated it with more recent, 2006 data. NRDC re-
searchers had created a “health impacts index” (for 
the formula, see the Technical Appendix) that quanti-
fies, using health endpoint factors, how each facil-
ity’s NOx and PM2.5   emissions increases premature 
mortality in the region, or more specifically, the local 
air basin.7  The index is quite useful as a broader 
geographic measure of health impacts posed by a fa-
cility. At smaller scales, it must be used carefully. We 
use it in combination with population-weighted NOx 
and PM10 emissions at varying distances from a facil-
ity for facility level analysis. For neighborhood level 
analysis, we use only proximity at various distances 
along with total co-pollutant emissions as indicators 
of health risk or burden. 
We then gathered demographic and socioeconomic 
data on the neighborhoods surrounding facilities, 
using the 2000 Census data (Summary Files 1 and 
3). We used block groups as the unit of analysis 
because it is the lowest level at which income 
information is available. Block groups consist of 
some number of similar blocks and in California 
have an average population of about 1,500. 
They are drawn to represent fairly homogenous 
populations in terms of demographic and economic 
characteristics, making them a good approximation 
of a neighborhood. They are more geographically 
detailed than census tracts, which are the next 
higher level of geographic aggregation in the census, 
and less detailed than census blocks, which are the 
lowest level of geography but one at which only basic 
demographic information is available.
Matching people in block groups with facilities is 
complicated. Facility addresses are a single point on 
a map but block groups are polygonal “aerial units” 
– that is, they have dimension. Thus, there are many 
instances in which a block group is only partially 
contained within a given distance of a facility (e.g., 
with a portion that is within one mile of a facility but 
with the remainder more than one mile away from 
that facility). A further complication is that block 
groups do not have evenly distributed populations 
– just think of a typical neighborhood wherein 
there might be several residential blocks adjacent 
to a mini-mall. Given that proximity is a central 
component to how co-pollutants affect people’s 
health, how do we determine a definite measure of 
proximity?
We settled this dilemma in two ways. First, we 
considered where people were situated within 
each block group, attempting to gauge how many 
were within the specified distance of a facility, 
and second, we varied these distances to test 
the sensitivity of our measurements. On the first 
consideration, we created circular buffers around 
each facility and used them to capture census 
blocks – the components of block groups – to 
determine neighborhood proximity. Blocks that fell 
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completely inside the buffer circle were counted 
as being proximate to the facility. Blocks that fell 
only partially inside the buffer circle were only 
considered proximate to the facility if the buffer circle 
captured the geographic center of the block (usually 
encompassing about half its area). We then tallied 
up the populations of the captured blocks to get the 
total share of the block group’s population that was 
within the buffer circle, and used that number to 
appropriately “down-weight” any association between 
a facility and a block group that was only partially 
captured by a buffer circle. If, for example, six of 
a block groups’ ten blocks were inside a facility’s 
buffer circle and they accounted for 75 percent of 
the block group’s population, then only 75 percent 
of the block group’s population was associated with 
the facility and 75 percent of the facility’s emissions 
were associated with the block group. This approach 
ensured a focus on where people actually live in 
relation to a facility and its emissions.
We also varied the perimeters to test for sensitivity.  
We specifically utilized half mile, one mile, two and 
a half mile, five mile, and six mile buffers to account 
for whether the inclusion of additional block groups 
moving away from the facility made a difference 
in terms of our analytical results. The broadest of 
these distances, six miles, is used by the California 
Energy Commission when it attempts to determine 
whether or not there are environmental justice 
communities located nearby any proposed location 
for a power plant. The other tighter distances have 
been utilized in much of the environmental justice 
literature to determine which neighborhoods might 
be considered proximate to, say, a facility listed in 
the Toxic Release Inventory maintained by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
While we do not, in this report, delve into how tight 
the relationship is between distance and co-pollutant 
effect, one reason for drawing multiple buffers of 
different radii is because of the large variation in the 
size of the facilities subject to analysis. While they 
are represented as points on a map, some facilities 
may cover a large area and may have multiple 
points of emission, in which case a one mile buffer 
drawn from the center of the identified stack or plant 
address may, in reality, barely reach the perimeter of 
the lot containing the facility. By running all analyses 
under various distances and identifying consistent 
conclusions, we can discount the distorting effect 
that variation in facility size may have on our 
findings. 
We use these geographic procedures to provide a 
picture of what each community looks like in terms 
of co-pollutant burden, and what each facility looks 
like in terms of the socioeconomic characteristics of 
its neighbors. Where a block falls within the reach 
of several faculties, its share of the block group 
is associated with each of those facilities to paint 
a cumulative picture. These aggregate portrayals 
enable us to examine neighborhood level patterns 
of environmental disparity and the facilities driving 
such patterns, the extent to which the co-pollutants 
of facilities burden nearby populations, and the effect 
of changes in emissions that might be anticipated 
under a cap-and-trade program. 
The Neighborhoods
Unequal emissions burdens from this set of large 
GHG emitting facilities by race or ethnicity may 
seem like an obvious point given that existing 
environmental justice analyses of other sources of 
pollution in California and Southern California have 
already shown disparities for stationary as well as 
mobile sources of air toxics (see, for example Pastor, 
Sadd, and Morello-Frosch 2004). However, the large 
GHG emitters subject to this analysis are a different 
kind of air pollution source and one cannot presume 
that patterns will hold without empirical verification. 
As it turns out, we find a familiar story: the 
neighborhood analysis reveals the facilities 
are unevenly distributed across space, with a 
disproportionate share in communities that include 
more people of color and more poor families.  
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However, the data shows an interesting nuance 
not always shown in other studies. With regard to 
large GHG emitters, in California, there are distinct 
differences by ethnicity that seem to trump income 
differences. 
Figure 2 shows the order of burden with the six mile 
distance range across income brackets and race. 
The likelihood of proximity is highest for African-
Americans, then Asians, then Latinos, and finally 
non-Hispanic white. At the lower end of the income 
distribution, racial disparities are the largest, with 
African Americans having more than two-thirds 
of their lower-income households located near a 
facility. It is not much better for Latinos or Asians, 
particularly when compared to whites, whose share 
of households within six miles of a facility hovers 
around 40 percent across all income levels. Figure 2 
makes clear that while it is true for all groups that the 
likelihood of living near a facility declines as income 
rises (as does the racial disparity between groups), 
there remain difference by race at each and every 
level of income. And while the focus here is on the 
six mile distance, this pattern is the same at other 
distances.
While Figure 2 looks at the likelihood of a particular 
group living within six miles of a facility, Table 1 
offers a more nuanced view: the composition of the 
neighborhoods within each of the buffers. The first 
five columns of the table present statistics for sets 
of block groups near any large GHG emitting facility 
by various distances; the same set of statistics is 
calculated for all block groups further than six miles 
away from a facility for purposes of comparison 
(column six). As discussed above, considering the 
results at a variety of distances helps ensure that 
conclusions are based on actual trends instead of 
statistical flukes.
The table shows that nearly half of all Californians 
live within six miles of a facility (46 percent), but they 
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Figure 2: Percentage Households Within 6 Miles of any Facility by Income and Race/Ethnicity,
California
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are disproportionately people of color – 62 percent of 
nearby residents are people of color as compared to 
the 38 percent who are non-Hispanic white. African 
Americans live disproportionately close to facilities; 
their share of the population within half a mile of a 
facility is about twice their share of the population 
living outside of the six-mile range. The Latino 
community share is highest at the two and a half 
mile range, where they make up about 40 percent 
of that proximate population as compared to only 
28 percent of those more than six miles away. Asian 
Pacific Islanders are also overrepresented within six 
miles of a facility, with the disproportionality most 
marked in the farthest reaches. 
Beyond race and ethnicity, there are troubling 
trends for other vulnerable populations: immigrants, 
youth and the poor. Immigrants from the 1980’s 
and 1990’s are overrepresented within the six mile 
range, with a pattern similar to that seen in the 
“people of color” category.  Children in poverty 
(not shown), along with all people in poverty, are 
both disproportionately near facilities – around 23 
percent and 17 percent within six miles versus 
16.3 percent and 12.2 percent more than six miles 
away, respectively, with only slight variation within 
the six mile radius. Though not shown in the table, 
we also examined figures utilizing 150 percent of 
the poverty line (since some argue this is a better 
measure of low income for a high-cost state like 
California) and found the same pattern. As for other 
income measures, there are more renters, lower per 
capita incomes, and lower household incomes near 
polluting facilities. 
In looking at the pattern, the two and a half mile 
radius is, we think, of special interest, partly because 
it captures a much more reasonable share of the 
overall California population (just over 13 percent) 
and represents a balance between stretching too far 
(six miles) and too tight (the half mile radius in which 
we capture very few people and are not allowing 
for the ways in which co-pollutants can travel well 
beyond plant boundaries). It is also the distance at 
which the highest correlation was found between the 
population-weighted co-pollutant emissions (person-
tons of co-pollutants) we later consider and the air 
basin-wide health impacts index utilized by NRDC. 
The snapshot reveals that this is also a distance 
at which many of the disparities are the most 
pronounced.                        
While the demographic indicators in Table 1 are 
useful, they do not account for the relative burdens 
the neighborhoods carry. Columns one through 
Table 1: Average Characteristics by Distance from a Facility
< Half Mile < 1 Mile < 2.5 Miles < 5 Miles < 6 Miles > 6 Miles
Total Population 96,362 575,014 4,368,581 12,844,279 15,492,631 18,226,753
% of California Population 0.3% 1.7% 13.3% 38.8% 45.9% 54.1%
People Per Square Mile 1,002 1,325 1,841 1,802 1,779 125
Non-Hispanic White 42.6% 41.2% 37.4% 37.5% 38.0% 54.0%
People of Color 57.4% 58.8% 62.6% 62.5% 62.0% 46.0%
African American 8.7% 8.2% 8.3% 8.5% 8.6% 4.6%
Latino 35.0% 38.1% 40.2% 38.6% 37.5% 28.1%
Asian/Pacific Islander 10.2% 8.9% 10.6% 12.0% 12.6% 9.7%
1980's and 1990's Immigrants 19.1% 20.3% 20.9% 21.3% 21.4% 15.4%
People Below Poverty Level 16.5% 16.3% 16.8% 16.9% 16.6% 12.2%
Children (under 18 years) 24.0% 26.8% 28.5% 28.1% 27.7% 27.0%
Renters 56.0% 52.8% 50.3% 49.6% 49.4% 37.8%
Per Capita Income (1999) $21,399 $20,794 $20,043 $20,950 $21,186 $24,013
Relative Median Household Income
(CA median = 100) 87.7 87.7 90.4 93.5 94.0 105.0
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five, for example, only break up neighborhoods 
according to whether they have any facility inside 
the specified distance, but some neighborhoods 
are within range of several facilities, and not all 
facilities emit the same amount of pollution. Because 
in-depth emissions modeling is beyond the scope 
of this project – although the results we offer up 
suggest it might be useful for a next phase – we 
instead employ a fairly simple methodology in which 
we sum up the tons of co-pollutant emissions for 
each co-pollutant by neighborhood (block group) 
from all facilities within six miles, and classify these 
neighborhoods into three categories: High Emissions 
(greater than average), Middle Range (about 
average) and Low Emissions (less than average), 
with the breaks derived through looking at the mean 
and what is called a standard deviation (see the 
appendix for details). The results of this approach 
are shown in Table 2. The comparison group, here, 
is the same used in Table 1, those neighborhoods 
in the greater than six mile range. We focus here on 
PM10 because is it a well known co-pollutant with 
serious health effects including respiratory problems, 
cardiovascular disease and premature death.8
Gauging relative emissions burdens by breaking 
up the neighborhoods by total emissions from 
all facilities rather than by proximity to any 
facility, we find some differences, particularly in 
racial composition, that did not show up in the 
first part of Table 1, while others that did show 
up are strengthened and still others change in 
different ways. African Americans are drastically 
overrepresented in the High Emission group of 
neighborhoods, making up about 16 percent of the 
population – more than three times their share in 
either the Low Emissions group of neighborhoods 
or neighborhoods outside the six mile range of 
any facility. Latinos have their highest population 
representation in the middle range of emissions, and 
while Asians are over represented at each emissions 
level, their share is the highest in the places with 
lower emissions. As a group, there is a disparate 
pattern for all people of color: they make up about 46 
percent of the population outside the six mile range, 
57 percent of those in Low Emission areas, and 66 
Table 2: Average Characteristics by PM10 Emissions from Facilities Within 6 Miles
High Emissions Middle Range Low Emissions
No Facilities Within 
6 Miles
Total Population 2,317,884 10,940,640 2,234,107 18,226,753
% of California Population 6.9% 32.4% 6.6% 54.1%
People Per Square Mile 2,638 1,746 1,425 125
Non-Hispanic White 34.4% 37.7% 43.5% 54.0%
People of Color 65.6% 62.3% 56.5% 46.0%
African American 15.9% 7.8% 4.9% 4.6%
Latino 34.5% 38.8% 33.9% 28.1%
Asian/Pacific Islander 11.7% 12.5% 14.3% 9.7%
1980's and 1990's Immigrants 18.7% 22.2% 20.2% 15.4%
People Below Poverty Level 17.5% 16.3% 16.8% 12.2%
Children (under 18 years) 31.1% 30.5% 30.5% 29.4%
Renters 50.6% 49.6% 47.3% 37.8%
Per Capita Income (1999) $20,986 $21,482 $19,945 $24,013
Relative Median Household Income
(CA median = 100) 90.8 95.8 88.4 105.0
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percent of those in High Emission areas. Again, while 
we only show the results at the six mile range, they 
are similar at other distances, including the two and 
a half mile distance which becomes the focus below.
While all the areas with emissions have lower income 
levels than in the rest of the state, and poverty 
generally rises with the level of emissions, one result 
may seem surprising: both the High Emissions and 
the Low Emissions neighborhoods have slightly 
lower levels of per capita and household income 
than the Middle Range neighborhoods. The reason 
seems to be that the Low Emissions areas – which 
have facilities but less clustering of facilities and/
or facilities with lower emissions – tend to be more 
rural, which is geographically associated with lower-
income.
In any case, the data suggests that, on average, 
communities of color tend to be situated near the 
facilities with the highest emissions, or clusters of 
facilities whose combined emissions add up, while 
pre-dominantly Anglo or mixed communities tend 
to live either around facilities with less emissions 
or beyond the range altogether. Place matters, and 
existing residential patterns leave communities of 
color more exposed to facilities that are responsible 
for the greatest share of co-pollutant emissions. 
The question, now, is how to ensure that emissions 
are reduced where the burdens are the largest 
(i.e. those neighborhoods in the High Emissions 
category), and in so doing, ensure that “co-benefits” 
go to communities on the least advantaged side of 
the climate gap. To begin answering this question, 
we try to determine which industries are driving the 
emission trends. 
The Industries 
To understand what cap-and-trade could mean for 
environmental justice, we assessed which sectors 
and which facilities pose the greatest threat to their 
neighbors’ health and where emissions reductions 
would accordingly provide the greatest benefit. This 
analysis reveals the distribution of responsibility by 
sector and facility. Such an analysis may inform 
the debate by helping to quantify the worst case 
and best case scenarios for environmental justice 
with regard to these facilities. For example, if the 
responsibility for the inequity is spread evenly across 
sectors and facilities, then exactly which ones curb 
their GHG emissions is less important for promoting 
environmental justice; therefore, cap-and-trade is 
unlikely to be a cause for public health concern 
because reductions anywhere would ameliorate the 
overall disparate pattern. If, on the other hand, the 
inequity is largely due to a small set of facilities, or 
largely restricted to a particular sector, then those 
facilities or that sector’s purchase of allowances 
or failure to make reductions could significantly 
exacerbate existing inequalities. Trades among these 
facilities would be of highest concern.
Of course, the real gold standard in this task would 
involve forecasting how and where trades would 
occur (or, in the case of fees, predicting which firms 
would choose to pay rather than reduce emissions). 
However, this kind of predicting would require good 
financial and economic data on firms that is difficult 
to acquire and complicated to model. Further, 
it would mean making assumptions about the 
details of AB 32 implementation that have yet to be 
determined, such as how many allowances would be 
auctioned and at what price to which sectors. While 
this analysis can have value, it is beyond the scope 
of this report. Instead we focus on the disparities that 
facilities are already causing and what policy makers 
and regulators should take into account when 
creating safeguards against health-impacting trades 
that could widen the climate gap.
To measure the contribution of each facility 
to environmental disparities, we account for 
three measures. First, we determine how many 
Californians are impacted by any particular facility, 
utilizing information on the density of surrounding 
neighborhoods. Second, we take into account 
the total tons of co-pollutant emissions from 
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the facility as a gauge of relative health burden. 
Third, we measure the racial/ethnic composition 
of the impacted population. These three factors 
in combination help us gauge the magnitude of 
disparity by sector, and later by facility; we focus here 
on PM10 emissions due to the regulatory emphasis on 
the established adverse health effects of particulates 
(and since the results for NOx are similar to those of 
PM, they are omitted from reporting for the sake of 
brevity). 
Figure 3 starts the analysis by counting up the 
populations within ranges of facilities and giving the 
total for sectors. Note that while power plants will 
affect more people overall due to their sheer number, 
refineries generally have the highest proximate 
population within the different ranges for the average 
facility. Power plants in California may also be the 
least harmful in terms of health impacts and least 
inequitably distributed by race. Despite the fact 
that there are more people living within a six mile 
radius of power plants than other facilities – primarily 
because there are so many more power plants than 
refineries or cement kilns – the 108 plants release 
the lowest tonnage of co-pollutants (see Figure 4 
Figure 3: Average Population per Facility (in Thousands) By Distance from 
Facility in California
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in which we order the various types of facilities by 
their PM emissions from most to least – the power 
plants show up most frequently in the long tail of the 
distribution where emissions are lowest while cement 
plants and refineries show up more frequently in 
the early part of the distribution where emissions 
are much higher, resulting in combined emission 
by sector being highest for cement plants, followed 
by refineries, and lowest for power plants). Power 
plants also affect the lowest share of non-white 
residents, particularly at the nearer distances (Figure 
5).9 This is not to deny rather spectacular cases, 
including the recent attempt to expand a power plant 
in Vernon that gave rise to significant resistance 
from adjoining communities. Such resistance 
made sense: the current Vernon plant is the top 
power plant contributor to environmental inequity 
by race in California, due partly to its proximity to a 
predominantly immigrant population living in an area 
of high population density.
Petroleum refineries offer a more problematic 
picture. They are, on average, located in more 
densely populated areas (Figure 3) that are 
consistently home to communities of color (Figure 5). 
The total minority share ranges between 70 and 78 
percent (depending on the particular distance) within 
six miles of the facility – on average, easily the most 
disproportionate of the three sectors. Particularly 
notable, blacks make up a large share in the closest 
distance buffers, more so than for cement plants and 
power plants. At the half mile distance, the African 
American share is more than double their share of 
the state population (14 percent as compared to 6 
percent) and at the one mile distance it is one and a 
half times as high. Refineries are also unique in that 
their associated demographics are quite consistent 
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throughout the surrounding geography, at least 
beyond the immediate half mile range. They tend to 
have much higher co-pollutant emissions than power 
plants, but lower than cement plants (Figure 4). 
Although cement plants are few and affect few 
(Figure 3), they are by far the dirtiest (again, see 
the distribution as well as the average emissions 
figures in Figure 4). At the closest range of half 
a mile, non-Hispanic Whites are actually slightly 
overrepresented as compared to the state. However, 
the number of people in this range of cement plants 
is very small (about 300 people in all). When we 
consider the much larger population within one mile 
(about 6,500 people) the minority population is large, 
due almost exclusively to the high concentration of 
Latinos who make up 64 percent of the population 
(Figure 5). The percentage minority declines rapidly 
moving further away from cement facilities due 
exclusively to a steep decline in the Latino share of 
the population, supplemented by a steep increase 
in the non-Hispanic White share, and despite both 
a steep increase in the Asian/Pacific Islander share 
and a more modest increase in the African American 
share. 
The Disparities
Closing the climate gap requires measuring 
the factors that contribute to any disparity in 
environmental burdens. To evaluate the contribution 
of each facility to the overall pattern of environmental 
disparity, we developed a single metric of disparity 
that combines the total impacted population, PM 
emissions, and the racial/ethnic composition of the 
surrounding neighborhoods.  Such a measure can 
characterize the individual impact of one facility, 
but it also allows us to aggregate by sector or across 
all facilities in the state. It captures the difference 
in relative impact between a facility located in a 
sparsely populated area with a population that is 90 
percent minority but whose emissions are moderate, 
and a facility in a densely populated area that is 70 
percent minority, but with very high emissions.
The index we developed – the “pollution disparity 
index” – measures the relative co-pollutant 
burden on communities of color, as compared 
with non-Hispanic white communities. We start 
our calculations at the facility level. Using the 
socioeconomic neighborhood characteristics that 
have been attached to each facility, we approximate 
the local PM10 emissions burden as the population-
weighted PM10 emissions (i.e. total person-tons of 
PM10) for people of color and non-Hispanic whites. 
Using such a population-weighted emissions 
measure means that a facility may have a higher 
score for people of color even if it has a lower share 
of people of color in the vicinity because, although 
the community of color is a lower percentage, it is 
larger in population and around a facility with higher 
emissions. We then subtract the population-weighted 
PM10 emissions for non-Hispanic whites from those 
for people of color (after adjusting the weights by 
dividing by the number of each group in the state), 
which gives us the pollution disparity index for 
that facility, or a measurement of environmental 
injustice (See the Technical Appendix for details). 
If the pollution disparity index is added up across 
all facilities in the state, the result is equal to the 
statewide difference – or disparity – in average PM10 
emissions burden between people of color and non-
Hispanic whites.
Every facility in our data set is given a pollution 
disparity index at the varying buffer distances used 
throughout this analysis (half mile, one mile, two 
and a half mile, five mile, and six mile), with the 
characteristics of the “neighborhood” determined by 
the distance from the facility. The pollution disparity 
index can then be used to aggregate (at discrete 
distances bands) for different levels of analysis – it 
can be combined by sector or across the facilities in 
a particular region to get the combined contribution 
of that group of facilities to the statewide disparity in 
average PM10 emissions burden between people of 
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color and non-Hispanic whites caused by all facilities 
under analysis.  
While we cover many technical details of this 
calculation in the Technical Appendix, a few are 
worth noting here. First, the measure of population-
weighted PM10 emissions upon which the pollution 
disparity index is based should be viewed only 
as a relative measure that compares the impact 
of facilities and their disparity within each buffer 
distance and not across them (similar to the Risk 
Screening Environmental Indicators risk score 
developed by the U.S. EPA; see Ash, et al. 2009). 
Second, the pollution disparity index can have 
positive and negative values. This depends on the 
demographics of the neighborhood near the facility; 
if the share of the state’s people of color residing 
near the facility is greater than the share of the 
state’s non-Hispanic white population residing near 
the facility, then the score will be positive (if reverse 
is true, it will be negative). Third, we are effectively 
assuming in this calculation that beyond six miles, 
there are no emissions. In practice this is not true, 
but as mentioned earlier, doing complex emissions 
dispersion modeling is beyond the scope of this 
report. Finally, the pollution disparity index is just that 
– an index of demographic disparity in local pollution 
burden and not a pure measure of local pollution 
burden. Thus, while it is useful for highlighting the 
most disparate facilities, it should be considered in 
practice along with overall local pollution burden 
(e.g. population-weighted PM10 for all people) as we 
do below.
The formula for the pollution disparity index also 
allows for determining average emissions burdens for 
individual ethnic groups. To do this, we calculate the 
population-weighted PM10 emissions for each ethnic 
group around each facility, divide it by the state 
population for each group, and then sum it up to the 
California level, at each buffer distance. The resulting 
average burdens are summarized in Table 3; there, 
the emissions burdens rise with distance because we 
are “allowing” a wider range of facilities to have an 
impact on any particular community.
The difference between the average value for 
each group and that for non-Hispanic whites at 
each distance in Table 3 is a measure of statewide 
disparity in PM10 emissions burden between that 
group and non-Hispanic whites at that particular 
distance. To determine relative differences in 
emissions burden, which allows us to compare the 
degree of disparity across the distances, we simply 
divide the average value for each racial/ethnic group 
by that for non-Hispanic whites at each distance. 
The resulting relative PM10 emissions burdens are 
reported in Figure 6.
With the exceptions of Asians at the half and one 
mile distances, and African Americans at the one 
mile distance, there are persistent gaps at each level; 
the relative emissions burden for all people of color 
combined is always above that for non-Hispanic 
whites (which is always equal to one in the graph). 
The trend for Latinos is similar to the trend for all 
people of color, which is not surprising given that 
Latinos constitute the overwhelming majority of non-
Half Mile 1 Mile 2.5 Miles 5 Miles 6 Miles
Non-Hispanic White 0.07 0.67 6.73 29.55 41.51
African American 0.10 0.64 11.55 75.23 115.03
Latino 0.11 0.88 11.93 48.61 66.37
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.07 0.54 11.26 47.62 63.57
All People of Color 0.10 0.77 11.54 51.08 70.98
Table 3: Population-Weighted Average Annual PM10 Emissions (Tons) Burden by Race/Ethnicity
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whites. They have the greatest emissions burden of 
any group up to the two and a half mile range where 
it levels off and declines slightly, while the emissions 
burden for African Americans soars dramatically to 
nearly three times the level for non-Hispanic whites 
at the six mile range. As for Asians, once we move 
beyond the one mile range, there are also persistent 
differences. Following the pattern for Latinos, as 
distance increases beyond the two and a half mile 
range, the disparity for all people of color combined 
levels off.    
The Sectors
Given the disparity in PM emissions burdens 
for people of color seen in Figure 6, we decided 
to examine whether power plants, refineries, or 
cement plants were driving the overall trend. For 
this analysis, we focus on the two and a half mile 
distance threshold. We think this is a reasonable 
distance for portraying our results in terms of 
emissions burden – and it is also the case that the 
population-weighted emissions burden at two and 
a half miles is the most highly correlated among the 
different buffer distances with the air basin-wide 
Health impacts index, giving us some confidence 
in this choice of radius. In any case, the relative 
contribution of the various sectors and facilities to 
statewide inequity as measured by the pollution 
disparity index is not particularly sensitive to the 
buffers (with the exception of the half mile distance 
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due to the very small populations captured in that 
range), so focusing in on one distance illustrates 
the overall pattern and allows for brevity in the 
presentation. 
Figure 7 begins this analysis by graphically 
displaying the difference in emissions burdens 
between people of color and non-Hispanic whites 
seen in the third column of Table 3. Figure 8 then 
calculates which sectors are accounting for the 
PM emissions loads of each group and for the 
difference between them. From this, we can see 
that while refineries account for the majority of 
PM10 emissions burden for all people, they account 
for a much larger share (about 93 percent) of the 
difference in emissions burden between people of 
color and non-Hispanic whites. 
Which facilities are driving this difference in 
emissions burden? Because the statewide 
difference is simply the sum of the pollution 
disparity index across all facilities, we are able 
to rank the facilities by the index in Figure 9. 
The ranking confirms that refineries are driving 
the difference, as they are eight of the top ten 
contributors to co-pollutant emissions disparity. 
Moreover, the top eight facilities overall actually 
add up to the entire difference; if you took all the 
facilities below that, you’d have an even distribution 
of PM10 emissions burden by race, since some 
facilities (displayed at the bottom of the distribution 
in that figure) disproportionately burden whites. 
The full distribution also shows that a vast majority 
of facilities have a score near zero. In short, a few 
facilities, mostly petroleum refineries, account for 
most of the observed inequity. 
The geographic location of the top ten facilities is 
depicted in Figure 10. There we can see that nearly 
all are in Southern California, with only one in the 
San Francisco Bay Area – the Chevron refinery in 
Richmond, which ranks sixth in pollution disparity. In 
Southern California, we see that it is mainly a cluster 
of refineries around the Los Angeles and Long Beach 
ports that are driving the pattern of disparity, with 
five of the remaining top ten facilities located in or 
adjacent to the port-side neighborhood of Wilmington 
(part of Los Angeles City). These include the BP 
refinery in Carson, which takes first place in disparity, 
and the Tesoro Wilmington Refinery, which comes 
in second. The rest of the top ten facilities include 
two refineries (the Paramount Refinery in Paramount 
and the ExxonMobil Torrance Refinery in Torrance), 
one power plant (the Malburg Generating Station 
in Vernon), and one cement plant (the California 
Portland Cement Company Colton Plant in Colton). 
11.54
6.73
4.81
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
P
op
ul
at
io
n
- W
ei
gh
te
d 
A
ve
ra
ge
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
(T
on
s)
Gap
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
All People of Color Non-Hispanic White
Power plant
Petroleum refinery
Cement plant
Difference
Non-Hispanic WhiteAll People of Color Difference
Figure 7: Population-Weighted Average Annual Particulate (PM10) 
Emissions Burden (Tons) by Race/Ethnicity for Facilities within 2.5 Miles
Figure 8: Population-Weighted Average Annual Particulate (PM10) 
Emissions Burden (Tons) by Facility Category and Race/Ethnicity for 
Facilities within 2.5 Miles
Source of Emissions:
Gap
14
P
op
ul
at
io
n
- W
ei
gh
te
d 
A
ve
ra
ge
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
(T
on
s)
Petroleum refineries account for the 
largest portion (93%) of the 
state-wide PM10 pollution disparity 
score, or difference between the 
emissions burdens for people of color 
and non-Hispanic whites.
People of color 
experience over 70% 
more particulate 
(PM10) pollution from 
large GHG-emitting 
facilities within two 
and a half miles than 
non-Hispanic whites.
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Rank Facility Name City
Pollution
 
Disparity Index 
1 BP Carson Refinery Carson 1.44
2 Tesoro Wilmington Refinery Wilmington (Los Angeles) 1.01
3 Paramount Refinery Paramount 0.62
4 ConocoPhillips Wilmington Refinery      0.52
5 ExxonMobil Torrance Refinery Torrance 0.40
6 Chevron Richmond Refinery Richmond 0.32
7 Malburg Generating Station (Vernon Power Plant)   Vernon 0.31
8 ConocoPhillips Carson Refinery    Carson 0.29
9 Valero Wilmington Refinery Wilmington (Los Angeles) 0.24
10 California Portland Cement Company Colton Plant  Colton 0.16
Top Ten Facilities Polluting Disproportionately in 
Communities of Color
Figure 9: Distribution of the Pollution Disparity Index for PM10 at 2.5 Miles Across All Major GHG-Emitting 
Facilities
Wilmington (Los Angeles)
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Figure 10: Map of Top Ten Facilities in Pollution Disparity  
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The Risks
What does all this mean for lowering carbon 
emissions, protecting public health and closing 
the climate gap? How should these findings affect 
CARB’s implementation of AB 32?  What are the 
broader implications for market-oriented policies that 
might eventually emerge at the national level?
The first point made by this analysis is that some 
trades or allowance allocations could widen the 
climate gap by worsening disparities in emissions 
burdens by race/ethnicity. The second point is that 
while there are legitimate concerns about outcomes 
resulting from trades or the distribution of allowances 
within a sector – such as when a power plant that 
impacts a large number of people in low-income 
communities of color eschews reductions in favor of 
buying credits from a power plant that is nowhere 
near any population of size or outbidding that power 
plant in an allowance auction – the real concern 
might be trade and allowance distribution between 
sectors.
The third point that emerges from this work is the 
fact that it is a relatively small number of facilities 
that are driving most of the disparity in emissions; 
while this could be a problem, the concentration 
of “bad actors” also suggests that regulatory 
efforts could be carried out in an administratively 
feasible and cost efficient way to maximize public 
health benefits of GHG reduction strategies in the 
communities that need them the most.  
Another point, which is of great importance for 
policy, is that targeting these facilities would help 
everyone. Recall, for example, that we employed the 
two and a half mile distance buffer in our analysis 
partly because of the strong correlation between 
population-weighted co-pollutant emissions at that 
distance and the health impacts index for the air 
basin derived using the measure indicated in Bailey 
et al. (2008). In Figure 11, we plot that measure 
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Figure 11: PM10 Emissions Burden and Racial/Ethnic Inequity by Facility
Chevron Richmond Refinery
Malburg Generating Station (Vernon Power Plant)
Paramount Refinery
ConocoPhillips
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against the pollution disparity index. There we can 
see that the two measures generally have a positive 
relationship – the higher the emissions burden the 
higher the inequity – and it is a handful of facilities 
with extreme values that are really driving the 
positive correlation (as they did in our analysis of 
disparity by race). The pattern suggests both that 
these are the sites of concern and that focusing 
on disproportionality will also have strong impacts 
on overall health (or vice versa). For example, in 
absence of the top eight facilities in terms of the 
pollution disparity index (labeled in Figure 11), co-
pollutant emissions would be more or less evenly 
distributed by race/ethnicity and overall emissions 
burden would be significantly reduced.
Table 4 illustrates this in a slightly different way by 
showing the top ten percent of the facilities studied 
ranked by the aforementioned health impacts index 
(which is more regional in scope). There we see 
many of the same facilities that were identified as 
the most disparate by race/ethnicity in Figure 9, with 
eight of the ten most disparate facilities also ranking 
highly in terms of potential health impacts.
Clearly, facilities have to be located somewhere and 
not all sites will find it cost-efficient to be the first 
to reduce their emissions. These facilities will be 
among those purchasing relatively more credits and 
the last to realize co-pollutant reductions in their 
neighborhoods. While we have not demonstrated 
conclusively that the disparity by race will sharpen, 
we have shown that this type of disparity could 
sharpen.
The text of AB 32 unmistakably lifts up health 
benefits from reduced co-pollutants as an important 
objective of the legislation, and the California Air 
Resources Board has long indicated a serious 
concern about promoting equitable environmental 
outcomes as part of its overall program of 
activities. With the issues of overall burden and 
disproportionate burden intimately related, CARB 
could craft safeguards that ensure market strategies 
address these concerns and help close the climate 
gap.
The Policy Choices
So what would an environmentally just GHG 
reduction strategy look like?  We suggest a menu of 
market-based and regulatory approaches that could 
work toward a more equitable outcome. 
Table 4: Top Ten Percent of California’s Major Greenhouse Gas-Emitting Facilities Ranked by the  
Health Impacts Index
Rank Facility Name City Health Impacts Index
1 ExxonMobil Torrance Refinery Torrance 54.4
2
3
Tesoro Wilmington Refinery Wilmington (Los Angeles) 50.0
4
BP Carson Refinery Carson 46.3
5
Chevron El Segundo Refinery El Segundo 41.2
6
ConocoPhillips Wilmington Refinery Wilmington (Los Angeles) 30.3
7
Shell Martinez Refinery Martinez 27.1
8
Valero Benicia Refinery Benicia 19.1
9
Mountainview Power Plant San Bernardino 17.5
10
Chevron Richmond Refinery Richmond 17.3
11
California Portland Cement Company Colton Plant Colton 14.1
12
Paramount Refinery Paramount 13.8
13
Valero Wilmington Refinery Wilmington (Los Angeles) 13.0
14
Cemex Victorville/White Mountain Quarry Apple Valley 12.5
15
Tesoro Golden Eagle Refinery Martinez 12.1
Etiwanda Generating Station Rancho Cucamonga 11.1
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First, one theoretically ideal but perhaps 
logistically challenging approach would entail 
pricing in the co-pollutants along with carbon.  
In this case, allowances might get extra credit 
(or carbon fees might be priced differently) 
depending on the ratio of co-pollutants to GHG. 
Suppose, for example, that a carbon fee was 
higher (or allowances were more expensive) 
if co-pollutants were more prevalent and/or 
population densities were greater; this could 
induce deeper GHG reductions in locations 
where health benefits would be maximized.
This is an elegant idea but one that would 
involve significant complexity in allowance 
design, could create problems in a trading 
system (which is easier if allowances are 
homogenous units measured only by their carbon 
emissions), and could significantly complicate the 
administration and compliance for either a trading 
or fee system. A simpler approach might be to vary 
permit prices (or fees) by the average relationship 
between co-pollutants and GHGs in different sectors, 
but this would be highly inefficient because it does 
not consider the substantial variation in marginal 
health co-benefits from GHG reduction that appears 
to exist at the facility level.
We see four other strategies that might make sense 
and be easier to implement.
The first strategy involves identification of those 
facilities that either have very high co-pollutant 
levels or make a very significant contribution to the 
pattern of environmental disparity in the state. These 
facilities – which should be small in number – would 
be restricted in allowance allocations, purchases of 
allowances from other facilities, and use of offsets, 
required instead to reduce emissions locally to meet 
their contribution to achieving the statewide carbon 
cap. While this might limit the market, it would be a 
small imposition on the system as a whole and would 
target only a handful of facilities. In a fee system, 
these facilities could be restricted in their capacity to 
pay fees rather than change operations.
A second strategy involves the creation of trading 
zones, based not on whether the facility imposes a 
significant burden but whether the adjacent areas 
are currently overburdened by emissions. Zonal 
restrictions on trading were used in the second 
phase of the RECLAIM program in Southern 
California, in which inland facilities were allowed 
to purchase credits from coastal facilities (where 
pollution was highest) as well as other inland facilities 
but coastal facilities were prohibited from making 
out-of-zone buys (Fowlie, Holland and Mansur 
2009).  This imposes some inefficiency but it is not 
administratively complex and it could be justified 
by the associated environmental benefits. However, 
as Kaswan (2009) suggests, certainty in achieving 
actual reductions in prioritized areas would largely 
depend on how allowances were distributed, with 
trading playing a small role, for example, if facilities 
are able to purchase all the allowances they need for 
any compliance period at auction or if they are able 
to rely on offsets to make up the difference between 
allowances holding and emissions. Thus, for this 
strategy to be effective it would have to be coupled 
with limits on overall allowance allocations and use 
of offsets in such zones to ensure that the total 
quantity of emissions allowed in the zonal market 
amounted to a net reduction of sufficient size. The 
zonal restrictions on trading would then prevent any 
increase above that level and likely lead to further 
reductions.
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A third strategy involves the imposition of surcharges 
on allowances or fees in highly impacted areas, with 
the funds being returned for environmental and other 
improvements in those same areas. In this case, 
some facilities that are not the worst offenders – but 
share responsibility for the highest impacts because 
of their location – would be forced to contribute 
as well. This would create a tight nexus between 
the surcharge and the improvement and would be 
justified by the potential health benefits that could be 
realized (Boyce 2009).
A fourth strategy involves the creation of a 
community benefits fund, based as a share of all 
the monies collected from allowance auctions or 
fees that could target emissions improvements in 
neighborhoods that are overburdened, regardless 
of whether they are in the same location as the 
sources. Such neighborhoods could be identified 
through examining dimensions such as the proximity 
to hazards, exposure to various sorts of air pollution, 
and community-based social vulnerability; we have 
been working with the support of the California Air 
Resources Board to develop exactly such a typology. 
While the geographic nexus between the emitters 
and the communities receiving benefits might be 
looser in this scheme – unlike in the surcharge 
approach – it would be more efficient in achieving 
health and other benefits (money collected is 
spent where it is most needed not only where it is 
collected). Neighborhoods need not be limited to 
pollution issues in how they spend the funds but 
could rather improve park space, job training, and 
other identified needs.
The basic concept of a community benefits fund 
finds support even amongst some who are critical 
of any tinkering with carbon market mechanisms 
(e.g. Schatzki and Stavins 2009). A benefits fund 
is also aligned with the notion of compensating 
lower-income consumers for the higher energy 
prices that will be triggered by limiting carbon 
(Boyce and Riddle 2007). All of this would be 
made more possible if the state was to take up the 
recommendation of the Economic and Allocation 
Advisory Committee (EAAC 2010) that indicated 
that the Air Resources Board “rely principally, and 
perhaps exclusively, on auctioning as the method 
for distributing allowances.” A full auction would 
make the system much closer to a carbon fee system 
and, as EAAC notes, have several other attractive 
features. Finally, legislation currently in progress 
in the state legislature (AB 1405) could make a 
community benefits fund real: it would force the state 
to direct a portion of any revenues generated under 
AB 32 – whether from fees or auction revenues – to 
communities that are historically disadvantaged in 
terms of both economic and environmental health. 
There are therefore real policy opportunities to 
close the climate gap. At the very least, CARB 
needs to create a mechanism for monitoring 
allowance allocations and trades or fee payments, 
and assess the impact on co-pollutants as facilities 
make their choice about how to contribute to 
achieving the overall cap. The research above has 
demonstrated a point that is really quite obvious: 
cap-and-trade is inherently unequal – and if it 
weren’t, no trades would take place. Given that, 
we should all be interested in exactly the pattern of 
geographic inequality that will emerge and whether 
it will exacerbate or ameliorate the pattern of 
environmental disparity that has marked the state 
and helped to produce the climate gap.
Minding the Gap
California is at a crossroads. With a world in peril and 
public health at risk, the state has chosen to lead in 
the global fight to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
rescue our economy, and protect the planet for 
generations to come.
The state has also chosen to make equitable 
environmental outcomes central to its approach to 
these issues. An Environmental Justice Advisory 
Committee (EJAC) was written explicitly into the AB 
32 legislation and while there have been tensions 
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The stakes are high and the time is now. In order to 
successfully make the monumental economic and 
social shifts required to address the climate change 
challenge, we need to engage diverse constituencies 
in ways that take into account everyone’s needs 
and health concerns. New and more inclusive GHG 
reduction policies can protect our communities and 
the planet. California faces a big challenge but also 
a big opportunity. We are poised to lead not only 
in curbing climate change, but also in closing the 
climate gap. As other states and the nation move 
forward, the impact of this work will multiply. We 
should get this right – and fair – from the beginning.
between the committee and the state, particularly 
related to cap-and-trade as a viable GHG reduction 
strategy, there is clearly a shared concern that 
implementation of AB 32 be done in a way that is fair 
to all communities.
As California takes steps to respond to the climate 
crisis, closing the climate gap needs to be a higher 
priority, starting with making sure GHG reduction 
policies don’t leave anyone behind and don’t 
unintentionally widen the climate gap.
The research reviewed here suggests that the 
concerns of environmental justice advocates about 
the unequal impacts of cap-and-trade are not 
misplaced. The major facilities that will be regulated 
under any carbon reduction program are more 
frequently located near people of color and lower-
income communities, with a handful of petroleum 
refineries making a significant contribution to the 
pattern of inequity. While we cannot predict the 
exact direction of trades, we do know that it is quite 
possible that an unconstrained market system will, 
at a minimum, fail to realize the full benefits of co-
pollutant reduction and, at a maximum, worsen the 
current pattern of inequality.
Ensuring that a market-oriented regulatory system 
– either cap-and-trade or fees – avoids widening 
the climate gap is essential. A series of simple 
strategies – prohibit facilities from making trades with 
and restrict allowance allocations and offset uses 
with significant health impacts, impose a surcharge 
in locations where health benefits could be high, 
limit trades by zone depending on overall pollution 
burden, or develop a compensation system that 
could redirect revenues to climate gap communities 
to address health and other concerns – are all 
relatively simple to design and implement and 
should be considered as part of the policy menu.  In 
addition, the state should consider the development 
of a monitoring system that tracks trades and offset 
use (or fee payments) to ensure that a market 
system does not contribute to the inequities depicted 
here, and to enable other mitigation policies to be 
triggered as needed.
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Notes
1 See California Health & Safety Code §38570(b).
2 Ibid. §38570(b)(2).
3 For a description of how the dataset was constructed, see 
“Appendix A: Co-Benefits Analysis Methods” at: http://www.nrdc.
org/globalWarming/boosting/boostinga.pdf
4 The emissions inventory can be accessed at: http://www.arb.
ca.gov/ei/emissiondata.htm
5 The 2008 GHG emissions data can be accessed at: http://www.
arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghg-rep/ghg-reports.htm
6 TeleAtlas, 2007.
7 Health endpoint factors are the estimated number of tons per 
year of a particular pollutant that can be associated with each 
case of a health endpoint (in this case premature mortality) in 
within a particular geographic area (in this case air basins). See 
www.arb.ca.gov/planning/gmerp/march21plan/docs/health_
analysis_supplement.pdf for the more information, including the 
health endpoint factors for each air basin.
8 See USEPA, AIRTrends 1995 Summary at: http://www.epa.gov/
airtrends/aqtrnd95/pm10.html
9 For Figure 5, in order to simplify the graph, the racial 
composition of people living near the different facility types at the 
five mile distance is not shown. It was chosen as the distance 
band to omit because it had a racial composition that was nearly 
identical to the composition at the six mile distance band, which 
is shown. 
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Technical Appendix
Constructing the Health Impact Index
Based on Bailey et al. (2008), we used the NOX 
and PM10 emissions to calculate a health impacts 
index for each facility, which represents the relative 
potential health impact of the facilities included in 
the analysis (see Bailey et al. 2008 for assumptions 
and limitations). The only difference is that we used 
PM10 rather than total PM because it is considered 
more closely tied to health endpoints. The NOX 
and PM10 data come from the 2006 ARB Emissions 
Inventory for stationary sources and can be accessed 
at: http://www.arb.ca.gov/app/emsinv/emssumcat.
php. The index also relies on health endpoint factors 
which are the estimated number of tons per year of a 
particular pollutant (here, NOx and PM10) that can be 
associated with each case of a health endpoint (here, 
premature mortality) within a particular geographic 
area (here, air basins). The formula for the health 
impacts index is:
Matching Block Groups and Facilities 
The challenge of matching neighborhoods and 
facilities is this: facilities are points in space and 
block groups are areal units. Mohai and Saha (2006) 
found in their study of geographic methodology 
that the method employed to describe the spatial 
relationship of point-location environmental hazards 
and surrounding populations is the primary reason 
for the varied results found in many studies relying 
on similar data and geographic coverage. The 
“classic” approach, used in most studies, connects 
census tracts to a hazardous waste treatment, 
storage, or disposal facility (TSDF) if such a facility 
is located within the boundaries of the tract itself, 
making it a “host tract.”  This approach does not 
account for people residing in nearby, but non-host 
tracts, that could well possibly live, on average, 
about the same distance from the facility. These 
discrepancies are particularly important given 
the tendency for TSDFs to be located near tract 
boundaries (which are often defined by roads) and 
the large variation in the size and spatial distribution 
of populations within census tracts.
Instead, Mohai and Saha recommend a distance-
based approach where tracts become associated 
with a facility if they fall within a specified distance 
of the facility as measured by either one of the tract 
boundaries, its centroid, or half of its geographic 
area. We employ a distance-based approach at 
the block group level that incorporates population 
weighing. We specifically drilled down to census 
block level to get the most geographically detailed 
population information publicly available and, 
as noted in the text, estimated the share of each 
block group’s population that fell within each 
buffer distance of each facility. Thus, rather than 
expressing the block group-facility association 
in binary terms (i.e., proximate or not), in cases 
where a buffer intersects the boundaries of a block 
group, it is expressed as a percentage or fractional 
association that is equivalent to the share of the 
block group population captured. In our opinion, 
such “population weighting” using block-level 
population information is important because even at 
the relatively detailed block group level of geography, 
an evenly distributed population within the block 
group is uncommon; half of the area of a block group 
does not necessarily include half the population. 
Thus, this method should result in a more accurate 
representation of the number of people and the 
characteristics those who live near facilities.
Emissions Categorizations
We chose the PM10 emission categories shown in 
Table 2 based on standard deviations from the mean. 
The means and standard deviations used were 
  
 
iHI = Health Impacts Index
                               
( ) ( )2.5/ /i x AB ABHI NO HEP PM HEP= +  
divided by the ratio of
 factor for premature mortality
Where:  
   
 xNO = xNO emissions in 2006 
2.5PM = 10PM emissions in 2006
10PM to 2.5PM
ABHEP = Air basin specific  health  endpoint
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calculated at the block group level for the natural 
log of the summed emissions from all facilities 
within six miles of each block group, across all block 
groups within six miles of any facility. The natural log 
function is commonly used to normalize measures 
that exhibit a “long tail” or exponential distribution – 
which describes the measure of summed emissions. 
Among all block groups within six miles of any 
facility, we defined High Emissions block groups as 
those with emissions over one standard deviation 
above, Middle Range block groups as those with 
emissions within one standard deviation of the mean 
(plus or minus), and Low Emissions block groups as 
those with emissions under one standard deviation 
below the mean.
Constructing the Pollution Disparity Index
The pollution disparity index used in this report, 
which was calculated at the facility level, can be 
described as a measure of the contribution each 
facility makes to the statewide difference in average 
co-pollutant emissions burden between people of 
color and non-Hispanic whites from the facilities 
included in our analysis, for a particular distance 
from the facilities. The derivation below describes 
how the statewide difference in emissions burden 
can be decomposed into the facility-level index. Note 
that while we used PM10 as the pollutant and people 
of color and non-Hispanic whites as the population 
groups, by making slight adjustments to the below 
equation, the index and associated statewide 
difference in emissions burden could be calculated 
to reflect disparity in emissions of any other pollutant 
and/or between any other two population groups 
defined by race/ethnicity, income, or any other 
measurable characteristic. 
In the derivation shown below, POC stands for total 
people of color, NHW stands for total non-Hispanic 
whites, d is distance, i is any facility in California 
included in the analysis, and CA means for the entire 
state of California.
Total statewide PM10 emissions burden associated 
with the facilities included in our analysis can 
be calculated as the population-weighted sum 
of PM10 emissions across all facilities i within a 
certain distance d (i.e. total person-tons of PM10). 
Average local PM10 emissions burden at distance d, 
calculated separately for each group, is measured 
essentially as a simple population-weighted average 
of PM10 emissions across all facilities i, using the 
population within distance d of each facility as the 
weight, but with one modification: the sum of the 
weights (the denominators above) is set to the total 
California population for each group rather than 
the sum across facilities. This weighting scheme 
implicitly sets the PM10 emissions to zero for all 
people beyond distance d of any facility, and is 
CA difference in average PM10 burden
burden burden
10 n, d
10 n, d
==
= =
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imposed so that disparities are figured relative to the 
statewide population rather than to the population 
within distance d of any facility. 
While this is not a realistic assumption – in reality 
PM10 and other emissions disperse and de-
concentrate at varying rates around a facility – in 
lieu of “fate-and-transport” modeling, this is our best 
estimate. Our method tests a variety of distances 
under the assumption that the PM10 concentration 
is constant within each buffer and zero outside 
the buffer. If similar disparities are found across 
distance bands and there is a similar composition of 
sectors and facilities that are driving disparity at each 
distance, then we expect a more sophisticated model 
would draw similar conclusions to those drawn from 
this methodology.  
In the last line of the derivation, each bracketed term 
represents the contribution (positive or negative) of 
each facility i to the overall statewide difference in 
person-tons of PM10 between people of color and 
non-Hispanic whites, and is what we have termed 
the pollution disparity index. A positive or negative 
index value is determined by the representation of 
each group near the facility; if the share of the state’s 
people of color residing near the facility is greater 
than the share of the state’s non-Hispanic white 
population residing near the facility, then term will be 
positive. If reverse is true, it will be negative.  
While the statewide difference expresses 
environmental disparity in co-pollutant emissions 
from the facilities included in our analysis at the 
state level, the pollution disparity index tells of each 
facility’s contribution to that measure of statewide 
disparity, which is experienced at the local level. 
The facility-level index can be summed up across 
any group of facilities by type or locale (e.g., across 
all power plants in the state or across all facilities in 
a particular county, city, or neighborhood) to get a 
measure of the contribution that group of facilities 
makes to the statewide difference. 
Finally, we emphasize that the approximation of 
“emissions burden” we use here is just that – an 
approximation. “Exposure” as used in the public 
health field typically implies modeling of emissions 
to determine concentrations at the neighborhood 
level, taking into account distance from the facility, 
how emissions are released, and local wind and 
atmospheric patterns, among other factors. Instead, 
emissions burden and the pollution disparity index 
rely on a rough approximation based on total co-
pollutant emissions and the number of people within 
a particular distance from the facility.
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